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ABSTRACT 
Oil and gas offshore facilities structures operating in harsh environments are associated with 
high risk and the likelihood of failures. Hence, frequent inspections are needed to enhance 
the integrity and reliability of these 'platforms' structures using a rigorous strategy.  
The purpose of this research is to develop an integrity management strategy for an above 
and underwater offshore platform steel structure using risk-based integrity management 
assessment. This strategy is developed in four steps: step one identifies the elements of the 
platform structures suitable for risk-based integrity management; in step two, identifies 
anomalies and degradation mechanisms. The third step is hazard identification using 
qualitative risk analysis, by hazard and operability model, and quantitative risk analysis, by 
the fault tree model, to calculate the probability of failure then qualitative assessment assigns 
the consequences. Step four ranks the risk to prioritize inspection and maintenance schedule 
and build an integrity management strategy. 
As an outcome of this thesis, we are able to identify and categorize the degradation and 
deterioration mechanisms for the fixed steel structure platforms and gain an understanding 
of platform structural risks and rank these according to severity. Consequently, increase and 
enhance the reliability and integrity of the platform using an appropriate integrity 
management strategy. The proposed risk-based integrity management analysis proved that 
the risk-based inspection and risk-based maintenance methods used in this work are effective 
in terms of time, efficiency and cost, through reducing the frequency of inspection from 12 
months to 24 or 36 months in some cases.  
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COVID-19 IMPACT STATEMENT  
  
Covid-19 has impacted our lives and capabilities to go around our everyday lives. Our 
academic life has also been affected by the pandemic through several means. Some of these 
factors include our ability to communicate with colleagues, travel, collecting data, access to 
labs, funds, and software. In this statement, I am clarifying the original plan of this research 
and the changes it had to incur to cope with the limitations imposed by the pandemic.   
In this research, I studied the risk-based integrity management of oil and gas offshore fixed 
steel structure platform. The original work plan was to develop and implement a risk-based 
integrity management strategy for the jacket platform using a risk-based approach. The work 
was divided into several steps and stages. The first step was to identify system and elements 
susceptible to degradation mechanisms and failure. Second step was to identify the possible 
hazards for the structure and develop a Hazard identification (HAZID) using a qualitative 
risk analysis by Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. This part of the study was to be 
used to provide a holistic view on the risk assessment of the system. The holistic view is 
needed to build a detailed quantitative risk assessment and to present the possible 
consequences as to provide details for the quantitative risk assessment. Afterward, the risk 
analysis was to be made followed by risk determination and risk-based inspection. Based on 
the above, an efficient integrity management strategy was to be developed.  
In the first step, the needed information was accessible, and I was able to select the system 
suitable for my study (fixed steel structure platform), and the details of the system. 
Consequently, I was able to successfully identify the elements of the platform susceptible to 
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degradation and failure. Also, the data needed to identify the anomalies and the degradation 
mechanisms causing failure and the safety critical elements of the topside and underwater 
structure, was gathered successfully. In addition, the data for the HAZOP study was 
accessible and the HAZOP study was performed as planned.  
However, the third step is what incurred the most impact due to Covid-19. In order to cope 
with Covid-19 pandemic, multiple restriction was imposed. These restrictions obstructed the 
continuity of this research step as planned. In order to hurdle those obstacles, some changes 
were adopted to the methodologies of data collection and analysis. These changes were done 
to the research to accommodate safety and public health emergency measures. 
In the original plan the quantitative risk analysis (QRA) technique, fault tree analysis (FTA), 
used to calculate the probability of failures then qualitative risk assessment of consequence 
of failure. Through FTA modeling we can determine the probabilities of failures using the 
platform elements reliability data which originally could be collected offshore but due to 
COVID 19 limitation a reasonable assumption was made for these data instead as well 
uncertainty and sensitivity study implemented to use it in the QRA model. Based on that 
model, risk determination and risk-based inspection was made and an efficient integrity 
management strategy. 
Due to the pandemic offshore field data collection is challenging and not applicable the data 
collection from the field was exchanged with case study and assumed data for jacket 
platform, the platform type considered in this study is a four-legged fixed type oil platform. 
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Instead of applying quantitative sensitivity and uncertainty analysis, qualitative measures 
were adopted in order to present and explain the uncertainties on the quantitative risk 
assessment model, some of the mathematical models had to be simplified as well. Some data 
for failure probabilities on platform topside and underwater elements were assumed. 
In addition, the consequences assessment was planned to be quantitative as well, however, 
due to the difficulty of accessing offshore fields and real data, I had to resort to the qualitative 
approach instead.  
Mathematical and engineering analysis as well are unable to be done due to limited access 
to licensed software. With COVID-19 Pandemic there are difficulties accessing library and 
archival resources and research allowances. In addition, COVID-19 has impacted the social 
and the scientific interactions with colleagues that usually helps in brainstorming and ideas 
that could have improved the research.  
Covid-19 has obstructed my ability to collect the needed data from the field to build a 
quantitative Risk assessment model, probability of failure, consequence of failure 
assessment and the uncertainty and sensitivity analysis. In order to overcome this challenge, 
I have changed some of my strategies and data inputs. I had resorted to qualitative studies 
whenever possible instead of quantitative analysis. In addition, I had to assume some of the 
data based on available information, field experience and reasonable ranges. This research 
was completed to the best possible capabilities during the extraordinary times we are going 
through. As discussed, in spite of the constraints imposed due to Covid-19 health and safety 
measure, I was able to continue 70% of the work through assuming data, changing some 
models and changing some parts of the plan. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Introduction to Oil & Gas Offshore Structure 
Oil and Gas Offshore structures have unique commercial and technical characteristics. 
Economically, offshore structures are reliant on oil and gas production, which is directly 
associated with worldwide investment and affected by oil prices.  Oil prices increased in 
2008 worldwide, and consequently, a lot of offshore structure projects started during that 
time period. Only a few specialized faculties of engineering focus on offshore structural 
engineering, including the design, operation, and maintenance of fixed offshore platforms or 
other types. This may be due to the limited amount of offshore structural projects compared 
with the number of onshore steel structure projects, such as residential facilities, factories, 
and infrastructure projects. All multinational oil and gas producer companies are interested 
in offshore structures (1). These companies provide support and funding for research and 
development that will improve the capability of their engineering firms and services 
contractors to support their business needs (1). 
Safety and Asset integrity in the oil and gas sector is essential due to the hazardous nature 
of offshore operations and environmental hazards (2). The offshore environment is the most 
extreme condition of operation in the oil and gas industry (2). The purpose of the risk 
assessment and asset integrity management is to provide the operator with a detailed 
understanding of all aspects of the risks and degradation mechanisms that may impact 
people, assets, and business. 
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Asset integrity management is essential for protecting assets, lives, properties, and the 
environment. There are several uncertainties related to working offshore that necessitates 
having a proper integrity management strategy in place.  
 
Offshore Platforms Types 
Offshore oil and gas platforms are massive structures equipped with facilities for drilling 
and production of oil and gas inside the ocean. An offshore oil platform may be fixed or 
floating based on design and fie-specific requirements. 
The various types of offshore platforms Shawn in figure 1: 
1. Fixed steel structure platforms (Jacket Platform) 
2. Compliant Towers 
3. Concrete gravity-based structure (GBS) 
4. Tension leg platforms 
5. Semi-submersible 
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Introduction to Asset Integrity Management 
What is Asset Integrity?  
Asset integrity is the term for an asset's capacity to run safely, effectively, and accurately. 
This applies to the entirely of an asset’s operation, from its design phase to its 
decommissioning and replacement. The challenge of implementing asset integrity is how to 
balance the inspection, maintenance, and replacement of assets throughout their life cycle 
with the costs to business – in terms of finance, time, and resources.    
At its heart, it is the managing of the degradation of assets. 
Asset Integrity Management (AIM) 
Asset Integrity Management is the way of ensuring that the resources, processes, systems, 
and procedures that deliver integrity are utilized, in place and will perform when needed 
over the entire lifecycle of the asset (2). Even If the risk of an incident is not reducible to 
zero, a significant reduction in the probability of occurrence and consequence is achieved by 
applying an efficient AIM strategy. The AIM strategy enhances the asset’s overall integrity, 
reliability, and performance. AIM is also described as the continuous assessment process 
implemented during design, construction, installation, and operations to ensure that the 
facilities persist in being fit for service. 
The integrity management covers the equipment, their supporting structures, and other 
systems to prevent, detect, control, or mitigate against major accident hazards. A loss of 
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integrity could have an impact on the safety of personnel, impact on the environment, on 
asset and\or on production and business.  
Asset Integrity Management strategy aims to: 
• Ensure you have the business processes, systems, tools, competence, and resources 
to guarantee integrity throughout the asset lifecycle.   
• Comply with the company’s procedures, industry standards, regulatory and 
certifying authorities (CA) requirements. 
• Assure technical integrity by the application of risk-based inspection, maintenance, 
engineering principles, and techniques. 
• Ensure the facility comply with the required safety, environmental and operational 
KPIs. 
• Optimize the plans, activities and the resources needed to operate the facilities safely 
and maintaining integrity. 
• Minimize the degradation of assets and assurance of the facility fitness for purpose. 
There is a set of procedures, requirements, and activities, which are carried out by 
different parties to ensure the maintenance of t the overall integrity of the asset. Included 
in these activities are HAZID and risk assessment process, maintenance and inspection 
activities, anomalies management, condition monitoring process, topsides integrity 
management process, subsea integrity management process, certifying authority 
requirements and regulatory compliance. These various inputs to the overall integrity 
management are summarized in the following figure 2 
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Risk-Based Integrity Management (RBIM) 
Risk-based integrity management is considered the most appropriate approach for 
determining inspection and maintenance strategies for assets. RBIM allows you to find an 
optimal balance between asset integrity and business risk, consequently maximizing 
efficiency and safety. A risk-based integrity management approach focuses on assessing 
asset exposure to degradation and failure risks. RBIM provide asset owner the ability to 
apply appropriate inspection and maintenance resources to those assets which providing the 
optimal integrity for assets and cost-effectively return (3). 
The objective of a risk-based integrity management approach is to ensure and provide the 
required confidence in the system integrity and consequently maximize its operating 
availability while optimizing the resources used to maintain the system integrity. The basic 
steps of an RBIM are: 
• Establish and define the required levels of confidence in system integrity.  
• Develop detailed knowledge as possible of the system past, present, and future 
operating conditions and environment.  
• Analytically assess and rank the risks of each potential failure mode specific to the 
system and highlighting the uncertainties. 
A risk-based inspection (RBI) and risk-based maintenance (RBM) approaches are then 
considered to eliminate the risks considered to be unacceptable and the uncertainties in the 
integrity management, and to maintain and increase system efficiency and integrity. 
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Figure 3: Different Approaches to RBIM 
 
 
RBIM Approaches  
The different approaches to risk-based integrity management are summarised in figure 3. 
The traditional, prescriptive approach is shown to indicate where it fits in the level of 
RBIM thinking. 
• RBIM approach aims to develop, optimize, and implement an effective and efficient 
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• RBIM implementation can be used by the operating companies that own offshore 
assets to enhance their asset integrity, operate safely, reduce inspection costs, and 
eliminate the frequency inspection and downtime. 
 
Research Objective and Scope  
The objective of this research is to develop an integrity management strategy for the oil and 
gas offshore jacket platform using RBIM approach.  
RBIM approach is carried out to prove that the risk assessment, RBI and RBM methods used 
in this work are effective in terms of time efficiency and cost as well. This work can be used 
by the operating companies that own offshore steel structure platforms to enhance their asset 
integrity, reduce inspection costs and eliminate the frequency inspection. 
In this study, the risk-based integrity management strategy is developed using risk 
assessment methods (hazard and operability study, probabilities of failures assessment and 
consequences assessment) to provide the needed details and results for risk ranking for both 
probabilities and consequences. Risk categorization is used in inspection and maintenance 
prioritization and intervals assigning, which means risk-based approaches (RBI and RBM) 
are better and more efficient from safety, time, resources and cost perspectives. This can 
help to decrease the operation downtime, resources time and intrusive inspection and 


































and RBIConsequence of 
failure
What to inspect When to inspect
How to inspect When to do maintenance
Integrity Management Strategy
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The process of the implementation described in the flow chart in figure (4) is as follow: 
1. Identify and define the system, which is oil and gas offshore manned fixed steel 
structure platform, then identify the elements of the platform structures suitable for 
the RBIM. 
2. Understanding and identifying degradation mechanisms and anomalies affecting the 
system. 
3. Platform safety-critical elements (SCEs) identification to be able to categorize and 
rank priorities based on criticality to be considered during RBI and RBM process. 
4. Hazard identification (HAZID) using a qualitative method Hazard and operability 
study (HAZOP) to provide a holistic view of hazards, anomalies, possible causes, 
possible consequences, and what action is required. 
5. Risk analysis by applying quantitative risk analysis technique fault tree analysis 
(FTA) used to calculate and assess the probability of failures, then a qualitative 
assignment of consequences using engineering judgment and experience in the field. 
6. Risk determination and RBI 
7. Risk ranking in order to prioritize inspection and maintenance schedule and build an 
integrity management strategy. 
As an outcome of this thesis, we: 
1. Identify and categorize the degradation and deterioration mechanisms for the fixed 
steel structure platforms. 
2. Increase and enhance the reliability and integrity of the platform using an appropriate 
integrity management strategy. 
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3. Enhance the safety, mitigate and eliminate hazards by decrease nonessential 
inspection and maintenance works and by decreasing the frequency of these scopes 
by applying risk-based approaches, consequently, decrease inspection and 
maintenance cost. 
4. Gain an understanding of platform structural risks and rank these according to 
severity.  
5. Identify critical locations or components that should be included in the inspection 
plan. Further, this study also allows the inspection and integrity team involved in the 
asset integrity management to provide input concerning the operational criticality of 
components, which may identify different inspection locations than those driven by 
routine planned preventive inspection and maintenance. 
6. Identify and evaluate variables that may impact structural integrity. 
7. Identify potential consequences of damage (i.e., asset/production, people, 
environment, business)  
8. Develop an RBI method and inspection strategies from an evaluation of the risk 
associated with a platform. 
9. Develop an RBM plan based on prioritization of structural anomalies performed 
using a risk-based approach and Risk Matrix, based on risk evaluation then we 
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review  
The offshore oil and gas platforms are a high-risk operation facility, which is mainly 
dependant on the capability and integrity of these facilities. In this industry, even a small 
failure of facilities could cause serious consequences, such as environmental pollution, 
immediate personnel injuries and long-term health problems, loss of income and reputation, 
etc. So, asset integrity management and efficient operation are more attractive to the oil 
producers’ companies. Almost every offshore oil and gas asset owner and operator wants to 
develop an asset integrity management strategy to operate safely, economically, and 
maintain the reliability of their assets. 
In the oil and gas industry, the maintenance costs are 40% of the total costs that are mostly 
spent on non-essential planned maintenance activities (4). The objective of integrity 
management is to eliminate the operational risks by implementing an efficient inspection 
and maintenance plans to reduce the business risk. The high demands of conduct integrity 
management activities in cost-efficient ways make the management level of assets 
management continuously search the ways to optimize and improve the maintenance and 
inspection management. That led to the development of integrity management strategies, 
which has shifted from time-based preventive approaches to the risk-based approaches, to 
improve the inspection and maintenance activities planning (5). The risk-based approach 
could have better decision making to optimize allocate resources to the most important 
maintenance and inspection activities based on the priorities of risk and resources limitation. 
That could control the cost of inspection and maintenance activities. 
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The purpose of this research is to develop a risk-based integrity management tool, built 
specifically for the offshore steel structure platforms. This tool covers the risk-based 
inspection and risk-based maintenance approaches for such platform structures to manage 
asset integrity sufficiently from safety and cost perspectives. In order to develop such an 
improved integrity management tool, an overview of the different existing risk-based 
approaches studies was done in industry today was reviewed,  the work in (6) development 
of RBI procedures and proof the efficiency of implementing the RBI  which led to the 
development of new Inspection, Maintenance and Repair (IMR) procedures to be applied to 
FPSOs. This has encouraged major companies and class societies to adopt Risk-Based 
Inspection (RBI) as one of the most appropriate procedures for IMR planning of FPSOs. 
Consequently, the challenge for both parties is to develop and implement RBI 
methodologies, which guarantee profitability and competitiveness of FPSOs whilst ensuring 
the required structural integrity throughout the service life. This study only focuses on RBI 
as the major driver of the facility integrity, but actually, to have a sufficient integrity 
management strategy, it is better to apply RBM approach as well to eliminate the 
maintenance activities of such FPSOs. Classification societies and oil producers are aware 
of these new requirements and are now engaged in the development of RBI, to consolidate 
the best practices in the form of standard methodologies to be applied by the industry. A 
method used by Bureau Veritas for risk-based SIM of offshore jacket platforms has been 
presented in (7). The method presented in (7) method provides risk-based inspection 
strategies and programs in compliance with the first standard for SIM . The risk assessment 
method comprises semi-quantitative and quantitative assessment levels (7). Thus, in addition 
to providing the risk level, it also provides an understanding of that risk. Concerning the 
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quantitative methods, they implement existing approaches for computing the probability of 
failure (7).  
 
Hazard Identification: 
There are now available many methods of hazard identification (HAZID) and techniques 
preliminary to hazard analysis (8). Such as” Checklists, What if? Analysis, FMEA, HAZOP, 
Event tree analysis (ETA), and Fault tree analysis (FTA). The Center for Chemical Process 
Safety has given overviews of these and other methods of hazard identification. A hazard is 
not always known until an accident occurs (9). It is important to identify the hazards and 
diminish the risk well in advance of an accident (9). 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) model 
The hazard and operability “HAZOP” study is a prime method for the identification of 
hazards. HAZOP study is now well established as a prime method for the identification of 
hazards on process plants. It does, however, make considerable demands in time and effort 
on the engineering teams involved (8). It has therefore appeared attractive to try to develop 
computer codes for HAZOP. It is recognized that HAZOP activity is a creative task and 
developers of such codes have usually been wary of suggesting that their systems could 
replace HAZOP, preferring instead to indicate that they should be used as aids to, or in 
advance of, HAZOP (8). The basic idea is to let the mind go free in a controlled fashion in 
order to consider all the possible ways that operational failures can occur. Before the HAZOP 
study is started, detailed information on the operation must be available (9). The HAZOP 
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technique is a structured and systematic examination of a product, process, or procedure or 
an existing or planned system (10). This is a qualitative technique based on the use of guide 
words that question how design intent or operating conditions may fail to be achieved at 
each step of the design process or technique. The guide words must always be appropriately 
selected to the process, which is analysed, and additional guide words can be used. This 
technique is applied by a multidisciplinary team during a series of meetings where work 
areas and operations are defined and each of the variables that influence the process are 
applied to the guide to verify the operating conditions and detect design errors or potentially 
abnormal operating condition (10). 
Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis uses information and data to identify initiating events, causes, and 
consequences of these events, and then expresses risk. The information and data includes 
expert experience, engineering team experience, design data, historical data, and operation 
procedure. All together help in identifying and estimating the probabilities of failures and 
possible consequences of undesirable events (11).  
Risk analysis intends to provide likely information to support decision making. By 
implementing risk analysis, the decision-maker can know different concerns and can choose 
the most effective and efficient solutions from cost and safety perspectives to reduce the risk 
to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) level (11).  
The results of risk analysis are screened based on the combination of the probability of 
failures and the potential consequences of failures using a risk matrix. The analysis could be 
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qualitative, quantitative, or semi-quantitative (semi-qualitative) based on the requirement of 
results and the available information: 
• The qualitative analysis mainly based on experts’ judgment and experience. 
• The quantitative analysis has a deeper analysis using logic models to simulate the 
probability and consequences. 
• The semi-quantitative way is to both use the descriptive information and simulation 
models to present the risk. 
The commonly used methodologies of risk analysis are event tree analysis (ETA), fault tree 
analysis (FTA), bow-tie, hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), root cause analysis 
(RCA) and failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA),  
Risk Concept 
Risk is used to identify the danger that undesirable events occurs to human, environment, or 
business (12). Another definitions of risk are: Risk is “the considered expected loss or 
damage associated with the occurrence of a possible undesired event”(13), risk is a 
combination of the probability of events happening within a time period and the 
consequences related to that event (14). Risk can be identified in qualitative and quantitative 
ways. When the risk is identified quantitatively, we use the probability and consequence 
equation: 
Risk = Probability×Consequence 
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The risk is unknown as the probabilities and consequences of an undesirable event are 
unknown. Both must be identified through systematic risk analysis. The risk analysis is  is 
done by first identifying hazards. Hazard is anything that is a potential source of harm related 
to human injury, damage to the environment, damage to property or loss in production (15). 
Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis 
Uncertainty Analysis  
In order to assess uncertainties in risk analyses, an uncertainty analysis is much used and 
recommended. To perform uncertainty analysis, there are a quantitative method and 
qualitative or semi-quantitative method (16). 
The semi-quantitative approach to uncertainty analysis is often considered as a simplified 
method compared to the quantitative approach. The results are expressed qualitatively, and 
therefore provide a more thorough explanation of what the uncertainty means in relation to 
the safety and other relevant aspects of the risk analysis.  
The qualitative approach, on the other hand, often reveals a certain probability distribution 
as a description of the uncertainty.  
The added information from the uncertainty analysis helps create a descriptive picture of the 
risks involved, which includes knowledge of both, more and less, certain information. Being 
aware of the level of uncertainty entails the information that lies in the awareness and 
knowing the weaknesses and facts one does not have the basis of finding. If this is accepted 
and acknowledged, specific boundaries of future events are not set, i.e. one does not exclude 
uncommon or unique events. This further involves being better equipped to handle 
prospective surprises as well as basing all decisions on a more realistic basis (16). 
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The uncertainty analysis is an assessment of the uncertainty factors connected to the 
Quantitative Risk assessment (QRA) model, and it covers the following main tasks:  
A) Identification of uncertainty factors  
B) Assessment and categorization of the uncertainty factors with respect to the degree 
of uncertainty  





Sensitivity analysis is performed to prevent the likelihood that minor changes to assumptions 
and/or data will change the conclusions of the risk assessment. Outcomes from the sensitivity 
analysis present how the results depend on different conditions and assumptions. The 
sensitivity analysis highlights the importance of significant quantities and can provide a basis 
for determining uncertainty (17).  
In quantitative risk assessment, sensitivity analysis is required in accordance with 
regulations to demonstrate the robustness of the risk model and are as such an illustration of 
the uncertainties (18).  
The sensitivity analysis is a bit like the uncertainty analysis in the way that assumptions and 
probable variations concerning calculations are assessed. The sensitivity analysis shows the 
effect of different input parameters/values, which allows one to see how sensitive the 
calculations are to changes in assumed input parameters and consequently realize the level 
of importance of assumptions. 
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This thesis presents a method for risk assessment, RBI, and RBM and inspection plan 
development as part of the risk-based integrity management of offshore fixed steel structure 
platforms. The RBIM approach provides a risk assessment for the platform's topside and 
underwater structure, identifying the platform elements susceptible to various degradation 
mechanisms, in the meantime classifying the platform safety-critical elements. This is very 
important in the phase of risk ranking; also, a HAZID study is applied for the platform's 
structural components (e.g. Helideck structure). The risk assessment uses semi-
quantitative/semi-qualitative approach to assign the probabilities of failures and 
consequences and this will be respectively quantitative for the probabilities of failures using 
fault tree analysis model and qualitative assessment to assign and rank the consequences. 
The RBIM method then used at a high level to perform relative risk ranking of platform 
elements in order to identify the most at risk and which require more inspection focus or at 
the unit level to define inspection interval and general inspection requirements, which 
allows, if required, local inspections' scope to be defined. The quantitative method involves 
a probabilistic assessment method to support RBI study. The inspection and maintenance 
strategy and program, developed by the method presented in this thesis, are focused on the 
routine topside and underwater inspections, and are based on the comprehensive risk analysis 
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CHAPTER 3: Identify System and Elements Susceptible to 
Degradation Mechanism and Failure 
System: Fixed steel structure platform (Jacket platform – 4 legs) 
 
Figure 5: Typical offshore fixed steel structure platform (19) 
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Platform elements susceptible to degradation and failure: 
Topside Structures: 
(platform decks, pedestal cranes, helideck, flare boom, derrick structures, lifeboats station, 
living quarter structure, walkways, stairs, handrails, gratings) are shown in figure 5. 
Underwater Structures:   
(Jacket legs, Risers, Anodes, Piles, spools, pipelines) are shown in figure 5. 
Degradation mechanisms and anomalies, causing failure of structures as in 
(20): 
• Overstressed primary steel member leading to significant damage and repair  
• Coating failure and corrosion leading to damage in primary/secondary member  
• Deterioration of personnel access structure (e.g., walkways, stairs, handrails, etc.) 
resulting in injury to personnel  
• Cracking in primary steel member leading to significant damage and repair  
• Cracking in secondary steel member leading to significant damage and repair 
• Overstress damage indicated by dents, buckles or distortion to plates or brackets  
• Coating degradation, corrosion on structural members or plating  
• Rust staining from welds in coated areas may indicate weld failure 
• Debris lodged on structural members, which could damage coatings or influence 
corrosion  
• Loose or otherwise damaged pipe clamps or other appurtenances  
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• Loose structural cladding  
• Corrosion – can be due to loss of corrosion prevention barriers such as coatings or anodes  
• Fatigue – crack propagation and eventually fracture of fatigue sensitive locations.  
• Leaks or flooding and Pitting  
• Coating breakdown or damage 
• Dropped objects (laydown area) 
• Poor drainage (pooled water) 
• Structural overload, Construction defects 
• Local corrosion at welds (pitting, grooving, etc.) 
• Loading from rotating equipment (pumps) 
 
Safety-Critical Elements identification 
In order to safely manage the structural integrity of the offshore platforms, the operator must 
identify all structural elements that may represent sources of risk as the platform ages. Those 
risks can then be managed and/or reduced through proper integrity management strategy  
Safety critical elements (SCE) are components and systems of an installation that directly 
impede or restrain the effect of an incident, including a pollution event. SCE identification 
have a key role in risk categorization and ranking, knowing the SCEs of the system ensures 
adequate inspecting, testing and maintenance programs are in place, and appropriately 
prioritized. Table 1 identifies the components of each of these SCEs in detail. 
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Table 1: Identification of SCEs 
Jacket platform structure Safety Critical Elements 
No. Safety Critical Element Title Components of Safety Critical Element 
1 Critical Topside structure - Cranes and lifting equipment structure and support 
- Flare boom structure 
- Hydrocarbon retaining equipment supports 
- Blast and fire wall support structure 
- Relief system supports 
- Telecoms tower supports 
- Open drain system structures (drain boxes) 
- Critical seawater system supports 
- Evacuation equipment supports (lifeboats, life rafts) 
- Helideck structure and supports 
- Escape and evacuation route support 
- Dropped object protection structures 
- DES structure (BOP support, including skid rails and supports) 
- Topsides/underwater jacket connection points 
2 Critical underwater structure - Subsea Structures 
- Supports for Risers  
- Spools 
- Piles 
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CHAPTER 4: Hazard Identification (HAZID) 
HAZOP analysis for oil and gas offshore jacket platform 
The system, subsystem and nodes for an offshore jacket platform structure HAZOP analysis 
is shown in Table 2 
 
System Sub-system Nodes 
Offshore Jacket Platform 
above and under water 
structures 
Offshore Jacket Platform 
structures susceptible critical 
elements 
Decks Primary & Secondary steel members 
Personnel access structures 
Pipes racks and clamps 
Pedestal cranes 
Drilling Derrick structures 
Helideck structures 
Lifeboat stations 
Living quarter structures 







Table 2 : Identification of system, subsystem, and nodes for HAZOP analysis 
 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study 
The HAZOP study presented in Table 3 identifies the potential hazards and operability 
issues in the steel structure platform and identifies anomalies, possible causes, possible 
consequences, and actions required. 
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System: Offshore Jacket Platform above and under water structures 
Subsystem: Offshore Jacket Platform structures degradation mechanism 













-Fatigue, loads  








-GVI of structure for signs of 
overstress 
-GVI of welded connections for 
signs of cracked connections 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 
predicted damage  
 Coating 
degradation 
- Surface corrosion  
- Paint failure  
-Excessive 
corrosion lead to 
steel structure 
failure  
-GVI of structure for signs of 
overstress, coating breakdown and 
excessive corrosion 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 
predicted damage  
 Dents  - Collided objects 
- High stresses  
-Structure damage -GVI of structure for signs of 
dents, damage 
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-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 






Cracks -Fatigue, loads 
-Collided object 






resulting in injury 
to personnel 
-GVI of personnel access 
structures (e.g., walkways, stairs, 
handrails, etc.) 
-CVI of exterior stairwell 
cantilevered support connections 
-CVI welded/bolted bottom 
supports and elevated supports 
for each external stair tower 
-CVI LQ support structure 
connection 
-GVI cladding beneath living 
quarters 











-GVI of structure for signs of 
overstress, coating breakdown and 
excessive corrosion 
-CVI interface connections 
between dissimilar metals for 
deformation, corrosion, and rust 
from below 










-GVI to ensure no leaks onto 
structural members 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 
predicted damage  
 
 Deformation 
& dents  
- Collided objects 
- High stresses 
-Structure damage -GVI of structure for signs of 
dents, damage 
-GVI of drains to ensure they are 
clear and providing proper 
drainage and prevent standing 
water 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 










-GVI of personnel access 
structures (e.g., walkways, stairs, 
handrails, etc.) 
‐CVI of exterior stairwell 
cantilevered support connections 
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resulting in injury 
to personnel  
 
-CVI welded/bolted bottom 
supports and elevated supports for 
each external stair tower 
-GVI to ensure no leaks onto 
structural members 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 











and repair and 
resulting in injury 
to personnel 
‐CVI accessible areas of flanged 
connection between dissimilar 
metals along the LQ perimeter 
 Damaged 
handrails 





in injury to 
personnel  
-GVI of personnel access 











-GVI of personnel access 
structures (e.g., walkways, stairs, 
handrails, etc.) 
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Cracks -Fatigue, loads, 
Collided object 
-Detachment of 
pipes leading to 
damage and repair 
-GVI of pipe racks for mechanical 
damage and welds 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 
predicted damage  
 Corrosion  -Coating failure 
-Exposed metal 
-Excessive 
corrosion lead to 
steel structure 
failure 
-GVI of structure for signs of 
overstress, coating breakdown and 
excessive corrosion 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 
predicted damage  
Pedestal 
cranes 
cracks -Fatigue, loads, 
Collided object, 
stresses 
-Cracking in crane 
pedestal support 
bracing leading to 
significant damage 
and repair  
-GVI of welded connections for 
signs of cracked connections 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 






-Paint failure   
-Coating failure 
and corrosion of 
boom rest or brace 
-GVI of general coating condition 
assessment 
44 | P a g e  
 
connections 
leading to loss of 
boom rest use and 
repair of brace  
 
-GVI to identify signs of corrosion 
and steel wastage and gross 
structural damage 
-CVI of Crane pedestal framing 
connections for signs of 
overstress, coating breakdown and 
excessive corrosion 
‐CVI crane boom rest framing 
connections for signs of 
overstress, coating breakdown and 
excessive corrosion 
-CVI/NDT required at any 
anomalous location based on 
predicted damage  
 Wire ropes 
deterioration  
- Harsh operations 
- Service lifetime 
 
-Wire ropes cutting 
leading to loss of 
crane availability 
-Annually wire rope inspection as 












-GVI of structure for signs of 
overstress, coating breakdown and 
excessive corrosion 
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significant damage 
and repair  
-GVI of drains to ensure they are 
clear and providing proper 
drainage 
-GVI of personnel access 
structures (e.g., walkways, stairs, 
handrails, etc.) 
‐CVI of support structure and 
connections for rotary table, 
deadline anchor, mouse hole 
catwalk machine, and BOP 
handling system 
 Loose bolts -Structure vibration  




and repair and 
resulting in injury 
to personnel 
-CVI/NDT required for drilling rig 
deck structure (aside from derrick 
feet) based on low predicted 
damage 
-GVI of welded connections for 
signs of cracked connections 
‐CVI HP pipe support structure 
connections 
‐CVI of Derrick pedestal welds 
(NDE as applicable) 
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‐CVI of BOP handling system 
welds 
‐CVI drawworks support structure 
welds 










leading to damage 
and repair  
-GVI of welded connections for 
signs of cracked connections 
-GVI of structure for signs of 
overstress 
-GVI of personnel access system 
-CVI/NDT required for helideck 










and repair  
 
-GVI of structure for signs of 
overstress, coating breakdown and 
excessive corrosion including 
planking landing area Survey 
position, orientation, coloring, and 
dimensions of all helideck 
markings for damage due to 
repeated use 









and repair and 
resulting in injury 
to personnel 
-CVI safety netting and 









craft support frame 
leading to 
significant damage 
-GVI survival craft support frame 
‐CVI survival craft support frame 
connections to Lower Deck 
‐CVI life raft service rail framing 
and connections 
‐CVI foundation, davit arm and 
keel supports, sheave houses, and 
escape chute connections 
‐CVI winch foundation framing 
members and connections 






-Paint failure   
-Excessive 
corrosion lead to 
steel structure 
failure 
-GVI of welded connections for 
signs of cracked connections 
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- Paint and coating 
failure 
-ROV survey for underwater 
structure anodes inspection 
 Exposed 
structure 
-Surface corrosion -Coating failure 
and Thickness 
losses 
-ROV UT measurements for wall 




-Boat or barges 
collision  
-Damage of boat 
landing and barge 
pumpers  
-ROV GVI on under water boat 







-Paint failure   
-Wall thickness 
losses 
-ROV UT measurements for wall 
thickness nominal measurements  
 leaks -cracks -Oil Pollution  
-Loss of production  
-ROV survey for any cracks, leaks 
or pollution  
Spools 
 
leaks -cracks -Oil Pollution  
-Loss of production 
-ROV survey for any leaks may 





-Paint failure   
-Wall thickness 
losses 
-ROV UT measurements for wall 
thickness nominal measurements  
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fatigues   
-Structure vibration monitoring  
-Piles GVI using ROV or divers  
 
Table 3 : Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis 
 
The objective of the above HAZOP study presented in Table 3 is to identify potential hazards 
operability issues in the platform and to identify anomalies, possible causes, possible 
consequences, and actions required, which can estimate the risks in accordance with the risk 
assessment. The qualitative HAZOP analysis technique uses a systematic approach. Hence, 
by this analysis, we already can use it in probabilities of failure and consequences 
assessment. Consequently, RBI analysis and RBIM strategy, and it allows selecting the most 
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CHAPTER 5: Risk Analysis (PoF and CoF Assessment)  
Quantitative Probability of Failure (PoF) Assessment 
There are several approaches to a quantitative Probability of Failure (PoF) analysis. An 
example is taking a probabilistic approach, where failure data or expert judgment are used 
to calculate a PoF. A different approach is used when there is a lack of historical failure data 
on the specific system of interest. In this situation, the general industry, operating company, 
or manufacturer failure data are used. The applicability of these general data is evaluated 
and judged. Such adjustments to general values may be made by knowledgeable personnel 
for that system to account for the potential deterioration that may happen in the system and 
the effectiveness of inspection performed. (14) 
Case Study: Probability risk assessment for jacket platform structure failure using 
(FTA) 
The platform type considered in this study is a four-legged fixed type oil platform. It is a 
four-legged jacket platform and consists of a steel tubular space frame. The topside structure 
consists of a lower deck, cellar deck, main deck, upper deck, helideck, living quarter, drilling 
derrick and pedestal crane. The jacket legs are horizontally braced with tubular members at 
all levels. In the vertical direction, the jacket is X-braced with tubular members. The platform 
is permanently fixed on four piles. 
The model data and assumptions in Table 4 are based on a knowledge base, available 
information, and experience judgment in the field 
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Event Assumption 
PoF due to an earthquake (21) 0.0001554 
PoF due to fire/explosion based on the worst-case scenario in (22) 0.25 
PoF in drilling derrick Module structure 0.08 
PoF due to boat/Barge collision (23) 0.01 
Structures drain system PoF due to blockage /leaks of outboard drains 0.11 
Helideck structure and supports PoF due to Fatigue, loads cracks 0.017 
PoF due to soil erosion at seabed near platform 0.019 
PoF due to platform structure vibration and fatigues 0.007 
PoF due to cracks and damages caused by dropped objects 0.13 
PoF because of legs steel degradation due to Marine growth corrosion effect  0.11 
PoF of Cathodic protection system 0.09 
PoF of bracing steel degradation due to Marine growth corrosion effect  0.13 
PoF due to Surface corrosion on exposed areas 0.085 
PoF of Structure cracks due to Fatigue, loads 0.017 
PoF of Structure damage due to excessive corrosion 0.07 
PoF of pipe racks and clamps due to Fatigue, loads, cracks 0.13 
PoF because of detachment of pipes leading to damage due to Excessive vibration 0.16 
PoF damage due to Fatigue, loads, Collided object 0.068 
PoF of cracking in survival craft support frame leading to significant damage 0.078 
PoF because of degradation due to environmental conditions  0.06 
PoF because of degradation due to exceeding Service lifetime hours  0.08 
PoF of wire ropes cutting due to lack of inspections and maintenance 0.27 
PoF because of cracks due to Fatigue, loads, stresses 0.089 
PoF because of cracks due to Coating failure and corrosion of boom rest or brace connections 0.019 
 
Table 4 :  FTA model PoF data and assumptions 
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 Name Description  Gate/Event Probability Reliability 
1 BE1 Failure due to earthquake  Basic event 0.000155 0.99984 
2 BE2 Failure due to fire/explosion   Basic event 0.25 0.75 
3 BE3 Failure in drilling derrick Module 
structure   
Basic event 0.08 0.92 
4 BE4 Failure due to boat/Barge collision    Basic event 0.01 0.99 
5 BE5 Structures drain system failure due to 
blockage /leaks of outboard drains 
Basic event 0.11 0.89 
6 BE6 Helideck structure and supports failure 
due to Fatigue, loads cracks 
Basic event 0.017 0.983 
7 BE7 Soil erosion at seabed near platform Basic event 0.019 0.981 
8 BE8 Platform structure vibration and fatigues   Basic event 0.007 0.993 
9 BE9 Soil erosion at seabed near platform Basic event 0.019 0.981 
10 BE10 Cracks, damages due to dropped objects Basic event 0.13 0.87 
11 BE11 Legs steel degradation due to Marine 
growth corrosion effect 
Basic event 0.26 0.74 
12 BE12 Failure due to Surface corrosion on 
exposed areas 
Basic event 0.18 0.82 
13 BE13 Cathodic protection system failures Basic event 0.09 0.91 
14 BE14 Bracing steel degradation due to Marine 
growth corrosion effect 
Basic event 0.26 0.79 
15 BE15 Failure due to Surface corrosion on 
exposed areas 
Basic event 0.18 0.82 
16 BE16 Cathodic protection system failures Basic event 0.09 0.91 
17 BE17 Structure cracks due to Fatigue, loads Basic event 0.017 0.983 
18 BE18 Structure damage due to excessive 
corrosion 
Basic event 0.13 0.87 
19 BE19 Failure of pipe racks and clamps due to 
Fatigue, loads, cracks 
Basic event 0.24 0.73 
20 BE20 Detachment of pipes leading to damage 
due to Excessive vibration 
Basic event 0.31 0.69 




Table 5 : FTA probability data for Fixed Steel Structure Platform failure. 
 
21 BE21 Damage due to Fatigue, loads, Collided 
object 
Basic event 0.068 0.932 
22 BE22 Cracking in survival craft support frame 
leading to significant damage 
Basic event 0.17 0.83 
23 BE23 Degradation due to environmental 
conditions 
Basic event 0.06 0.94 
24 BE24 Degradation due to exceeding Service 
lifetime hours 
Basic event 0.08 0.92 
25 BE25 Wire ropes cutting due to lack of 
inspections and maintenance 
Basic event 0.6 0.4 
26 BE26 Cracks due to Fatigue, loads, stresses Basic event 0.15 0.85 
27 BE27 Cracks due to Coating failure and 
corrosion of boom rest or brace 
connections 
Basic event 0.22 0.78 
28 Gate 1 Failure in foundation OR-Gate 0.0026 0.997 
29 Gate 2 Failure in jacket structure    OR-Gate 0.4631 0.536 
30 Gate 3 Failure in topside structure    OR-Gate 0.4977 0.502 
31 Gate 4 Failure due to pedestal cranes collapse    OR-Gate 0.4358 0.564 
32 Gate 5 Failure in Piles    AND-Gate 0.0001 0.999 
33 Gate 6 Failure in Mud mat AND-Gate 0.0024 0.997 
34 Gate 7 Jacket Legs failures OR-Gate 0.2589 0.741 
35 Gate 8 Jacket Bracing failures OR-Gate 0.2755 0.724 
36 Gate 9 Failure on primary / secondary deck 
structure 
OR-Gate 0.0858 0.914 
37 Gate 10 Piping system failure OR-Gate 0.2692 0.730 
38 Gate 11 Evacuation equipment supports failure 
(lifeboats, life rafts) 
OR-Gate 0.1406 0.859 
39 Gate 12 Failure due to Wire ropes deterioration OR-Gate 0.3686 0.631 
40 Gate 13 Failure due to Cracking in crane 
pedestal support bracing 
 
OR-Gate 0.1063 0.893 

























Failure due to 
earthquake   
Failure in 
jacket 
structure    
 
Failure due to 




structure   
Failure in 
topside 
structure    
Failure due to 
boat/Barge 
collision    
Failure due to 
pedestal 
cranes 









Piles    
Failure in 
Mud mat 















system failure due 
to blockage /leaks 



























fatigues   
Soil erosion 





















































Cracks due to 
Coating failure 
and corrosion of 
boom rest or 
brace connections 
Structure 


















pipes leading to 
damage due to 
Excessive 
vibration 
Failure of pipe 
racks and clamps 
due to Fatigue, 
loads, cracks 
55 | P a g e  
 




The outcome of analysis:  
Based on the quantitative analysis completed using FTA diagram depicted in figure 6 and 
the results of the probabilities of failure calculation in Table 5, We can divide the platform 
structure element to high risk, moderate risk, and low risk.  This means the most critical SHE 
and business equipment on the facility are assigned the highest failure probabilities. In this 
analysis we  identify the  elements having high risk rank such as (passive fire protection 
system PFP, lifting equipment, pedestal cranes, Helideck, lifeboat station and living quarter 
) then moderate risk such as ( jacket legs and bracing degradation, pipe racks and clamps 
cracks and fatigues,  personnel access structure, Pipes racks and clamps, Drilling module 
structures, evacuation equipment) then low risk elements ( platform primary and secondary 
steel structure, anodes, underwater structures and subsea pipelines, earthquakes ).The 
outputs we have from this analysis ise used along with CoF results to help assign RBI matrix 
and integrity management plan. 
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Model uncertainty and sensitivity analysis 
The probabilities in PoF assessment are knowledge-based (subjective) and used as a measure 
of uncertainty and sensitivity. The knowledge-based understanding of a probability, P, is 
necessary to simplify the analysis and calculations of PoF, as well as directly assessing the 
uncertainties. 
Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis seek to produce more desirable outcomes, by providing 
insights about the uncertainties relating to possible consequences of a decision and reducing 
these uncertainties. In QRA, most approaches to figure out uncertainty look to be based on 
the belief that uncertainty relates to the calculated probabilities and expected values.  
The next step is to rate all uncertainties. Degree of uncertainty is categorised in the Table 6 





- The data not available, or unreliable  
- The assumptions represent strong simplifications  
- There is lack of agreement/consensus among experts  
- The events involved are not well understood; degradation models are non-existent 
or known/believed to give poor predictions  
Medium 
- Some reliable data are available  
- The assumptions are somewhat reasonable  
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- There are variations in the consensus of experts  
- The events involved are well understood, but the degradation models used are 
simple/crude  
Low 
- Much reliable data available  
- The assumptions are very reasonable  
- There is broad agreement/consensus among experts  
- The events involved are well understood; the degradation models used are known 
to give predictions with the required accuracy  
 
Table 6 : Degree of uncertainty (16) 
 




- Relatively small changes in base case values needed to alter the outcome (e.g. 
exceeded risk acceptance criterion)  
- High degree of uncertainty  
Medium 
- Relatively large changes in base case values needed to alter the outcome  
- Medium degree of uncertainty  
Low 
- Unrealistically large changes in base case values needed to alter the outcome  
- Low degree of uncertainty 
 
Table 7: Degree of sensitivity (16) 
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The uncertainty- and sensitivity factors’ grading (low, medium or high) are scores of how 
significant the particular components and events are in relation to the entire system PoF 
assessment. 
The uncertainty factors found in the assumption that the jacket platform failure data could 
be varied depending on operation, service and environmental conditions and asset condition. 
Determination of uncertainty and sensitivity degrees: 
A) As shown in Table 8 Probabilities data assumptions have a Low degree of uncertainty 






PoF due to earthquake L L 
PoF due to fire/explosion L L 
PoF due to boat/Barge collision L L 
 
Table 8: Summarized degree on uncertainty and sensitivity (L) 
 
B) Probabilities data assumptions have a Medium degree of uncertainty and sensitivity 
as a data assumption are somewhat reasonable, the degree of uncertainty in this case 






PoF in drilling derrick Module structure M M 
Structures drain system failure due to blockage /leaks of 
outboard drains 
M M 
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Helideck structure and supports failure due to Fatigue, loads & 
cracks 
M M 
PoF due to platform structure vibration and fatigues M M 
PoF because of legs steel degradation due to Marine growth 
corrosion effect 
M M 
PoF due to Surface corrosion on exposed areas M M 
probability of Cathodic protection system failures M M 
PoF of bracing steel degradation due to Marine growth corrosion 
effect 
M M 
PoF of Structure cracks due to Fatigue and loads M M 
PoF of Structure damage due to excessive corrosion M M 
PoF of pipe racks and clamps due to Fatigue, loads, cracks M M 
PoF because of detachment of pipes leading to damage due to 
Excessive vibration 
M M 
PoF of cracking in survival craft support frame leading to 
significant damage 
M M 
PoF because of degradation due to environmental conditions M M 
PoF because of degradation due to exceeding Service lifetime 
hours 
M M 
PoF of wire ropes cutting due to lack of inspections and 
maintenance 
M M 
PoF because of cracks due to Fatigue, loads, stresses M M 
PoF because of cracks due to Coating failure and corrosion of 
boom rest or brace connections 
M M 
 
Table 9: Summarized degree on uncertainty and sensitivity (M) 
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C) Probabilities data assumptions have a High degree of uncertainty due to lack of 
documentation for sea bottom conditions and soil erosion at seabed. The degree of 
sensitivity is judged to be High because a probable sea bottom condition can 
potentially lead to cracks in the piles and foundation.  And similar exposure to 
dropped objects have a High degree of uncertainty, the degree of sensitivity is also 
High because the unknown circumstances may lead to dropped or collided objects as 







PoF due to soil erosion at seabed near platform H H 
PoF damage due to Fatigue, loads caused by Collided object H H 
PoF due to cracks and damages caused by dropped objects H H 
 
Table 10: Summarized degree on uncertainty and sensitivity (H) 
 
The analysis is established as an addition to the risk assessment model in order to implement 
all uncertainties in relation to assumptions and simplifications in the risk prioritization and 
categorization and accordingly the final RBIM strategy consideration.  
All assumptions, simplifications, etc. made in the previous sections should by this phase 
have been noted, and hence be of significant attribution when identifying the uncertainty 
factors. 
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Consequence of Failure (CoF) Assessment 
The consequences assessment of platform structure can include: impact on public safety, 
employee safety, the environment, business, and direct and indirect financial costs. The 
focus of any RBI program applied to Oil and Gas platforms structures must be safety driven 
and cost efficient. Although the other consequences are undoubtedly significant, they must 
not be given higher importance than safety. As well, the importance of safety must not be 
diluted due to the inclusion of other consequences in an RBI program.  
As a minimum, the following factors must be considered for each failure scenario identified 
during the consequence assessment: 
• Expected failure modes – coating degradation, surface corrosion, crack, missing 
components, loose bolts, etc.  
• Frequency and density of employee population,  
• Process fluid properties (with respect to flammability, toxicity, exposure limits and 
reactivity),  
• Potential for fatality or knockdown 
• Potential of collapse. 
• Potential for explosion and fire 
• Environmental impact. 
The outcome of this consequence assessment should be considered when determining risk 
(see Risk Determination below). 
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It is useful to assess the consequences of failure in both mitigated and unmitigated states. 
This will allow for a determination of the effectiveness and reliability of the mitigation used 
and may highlight other forms of mitigation that would be more beneficial. 
For each failure mode identified, it is necessary to develop a credible consequence scenario 
arising from the anomalies could lead to failure. This limiting scenario should include the 
events that lead to inspect or repairing the equipment to meet its performance requirements. 
Examples of failure modes resulting in consequence scenarios are as follows: 
• Cracking in primary steel member leading to significant damage and repair 
• Deterioration of personnel access structure (e.g., walkways, stairs, handrails, etc.) 
resulting in injury to personnel  
• Coating failure and corrosion leading to damage in primary/secondary member  
  
There are four categories of consequences that need to be assessed for each credible risk 
scenario:  SHE (Safety, Health and Environmental) consequences, and business/ financial 
consequences, crucial consequences, Non-Crucial consequences. 
Category I: “SHE consequence” The evaluation of SHE consequences involves 
identification of the hazards present due to anomalies and findings within inspections. These 
are anomalies captured during inspections that need to be addressed immediately if the 
anomaly has a high probability of causing a failure; they pose a large risk to safety.  
Category II:  “Business/Financial consequence”  Business consequences are estimated based 
on anomalies/findings captured during inspections that need to be addressed as soon as 
possible as a failure could lead to lost margin (or production) costs, shutdown, slowdown, 
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off-spec product, repair costs and loss of customer goodwill. The consequences should be 
estimated separately for each of the following: 
• Maintenance/repair costs to restore the required level of structure integrity  
• Loss of profit margin (or production) during a platform shutdown or turnaround 
 
Category III: “Crucial consequence” Crucial consequences are estimated based on 
anomalies/findings captured during inspections that need to be addressed but do not require 
immediate attention. Anomalies/findings can be monitored in frequency basis on upcoming 
inspections to determine the degradation class and when action needed for these anomalies. 
 
Category IV: “Non-Crucial consequence” Non-Crucial consequences are estimated based 
on anomalies/findings captured during inspections that do not cause a risk to business, 
structural integrity or safety. 
 
Qualitative Consequences Analysis 
A qualitative approach involves identification of the system elements, and the risks present 
as a result of operating conditions. Based on expert knowledge and experience, the 
consequences of failure (safety, health, environmental and financial impacts) can be 
estimated for each system element (14). 
For this approach, a consequences category (very high, high, moderate, or low) is typically 
assigned for each element in the system. 
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The following Table 11 shows the consequence of failure for the anomalies found on steel 












No consequence IV Low 
Minor coating 
degradation on primary 
/ secondary steel 
structure 
Coating / painting deterioration III Moderate 
Excessive coating 
degradation on primary 
/ secondary steel 
structure 




corrosion on primary / 
secondary steel 
structure 
Steel structure thickness 
deterioration and losses 
II High 
Excessive surface 
corrosion on primary / 
secondary steel 
structure 
Steel structure damage and failures 
needs repair 
II High 
Cracks on Primary and 
secondary steel 
members 
Cracking in primary/secondary steel 
member leading to significant 
damage and repair 
 
I Very High 
Cracks on LQ and 
personnel access 
structures 
Deterioration of personnel access 
structure (e.g., walkways, stairs, 
handrails, etc.) resulting in injury to 
personnel 
 
I Very High 
Cracks on Pipe racks 
and clamps 
Piping system failure II High 
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Damage on boat 
landing /Barge bumper 
Difficulties for support vessels and 
barges to approach the platform 
II High 
Blockage /leaks of 
outboard drains 
Structures drain system failure II High 
cracks on Helideck 
structure and supports 
Cracking in Helideck substructure 





Dropped objects resulting personnel 
injury 
I Very High 
Platform structure 
vibration and fatigues 
Overstress may lead to fatigues and 
cracks on platform beams 
II High 
Damaged Grating or 
missing connections 
Deterioration of grating affect 
platform structure integrity 
 
III Moderate 
Marine growth on 
Jacket Legs steel 
degradation 
surface corrosion and steel structure 




Cathodic protection system failure 
causes excessive corrosion that 
leads to structure deterioration 
III Moderate 
Cracking in survival 
craft support frame 
Cracking in survival craft support 




Cracks on Pedestal 
Crane critical areas and 
welds 
Cracking in crane pedestal leading 
to significant damage and crane 
collapse 
resulting in injury to personnel 
 




Evacuation equipment supports 
failure (lifeboats, life rafts) 
 
I Very High 
 
Table 11 : Consequence categories and risk ranking 
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CHAPTER 6: Risk Determination & Risk matrix 
Risk Determination 
Based on the described consequence and probability of failure, the risk level for each item 
can be assigned (24). The RBI program should explain how risk is derived. Usually, 
consequence and probability are plotted versus each other in a matrix with the location of 
the point falling into a range with a pre-defined risk index. A risk matrix example is shown 
as per the below Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 : Risk Matrix (13) 
 
Basically, the resulting risk for each item (High, Moderate, Low) based on the assessment 
should be used to determine the inspection frequency and strategy.  The most important and 
critical step during this stage is the assignment of the level of risk to the matrix. The RBI 
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program should identify how each risk will be addressed in terms of inspection frequency, 
scope and other mitigation techniques.  
After PoF and CoF are created, the risk ranking process consists in rating the platform 
structural elements risk levels from lower to higher risk levels with regard to PoF and CoF 
ranking Table 12 and Table 13. 
The results of the risk ranking developed will be used for the RBI process to prioritize the 
criticality and inspection efforts. (7) 
 
(PoF) Probability of failure 
(PoF) Ranking (PoF) Description 
Very Low 
Once in 100 or more facility lives 
Practically Impossible “Failure not foreseeable under normal operating 
conditions within the remaining life of the asset” 
Low 
Once in 10 facility lives 
Not Likely to Occur “Failure possible within life of asset” 
Medium 
Once in the facility life 
Possibility of Occurring Sometime “Failure probable within life of asset” 
High 
5 times in the facility life 
Possibility of Isolated Incidents “High probability of failure within life of 
asset” 
Very High 
20 or more times in the facility life 
Possibility of Repeated Incidents “Very high probability of failure within life 
of asset” 
 
Table 12 : (PoF) Probability of Failure ranking (25) 
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I (Very High) 
One or more 
fatalities, or 
serious long-term 
health impact on 
public. 
Large community; 
evacuation of 1000 










Serious injury to 
personnel, but 
limited impact on 
public. 
Small community; 












for personnel, but 
no impact on 
public. 
Minor (families); 
evacuation of less 











Minor impact on 
personnel (first 
aid). 
Minimal to none; no 
evacuations; minor 
inconveniences to a 
few people. 






Table 13 : (CoF) Consequence of Failure ranking (25) 
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Risk Matrix 
Risk matrices are the most commonly used tools for risk categorization in qualitative and 
semi-quantitative risk assessment. As per the risk concept, the consequences of failure and 
the probability of failure are placed in a matrix to present the risk level. Typically, the risk 
levels are categorized into three regions shown in the matrix in Table 14. 
• The high-risk level is shown in the red color. 
• The medium risk level is shown in medium region of matrix with yellow color.  
• The low risk level is shown in the green color. 
 
Probability of failure 
Consequence of 
failure 
Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
I High High High Moderate Moderate 
II High High Moderate Moderate Low 
III Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Low 
IV Moderate Low Low Low Low 
 
Table 14 : RBI Risk matrix (25) 
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CHAPTER 7: Risk-Based Integrity Management Strategy 
Risk-based integrity management strategy attempts to answer four important questions 
related to integrity of the system: (i)what to inspect? (ii)When to inspect? (iii) How to 
inspect? (iv)When to do maintenance? Having known the answers to these four questions, it 
is safe to say that integrity planning based on risk approach is expected to provide efficient 
and optimized inspection (RBI) and maintenance (RBM), which minimizes the 
consequences of system downtime or failure. 
Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)  
The Risk-based inspection (RBI) is a recognized decision-making technique to optimize 
inspection plans and intervals for offshore steel structure platform topside and subsea 
elements based on risk involving the probability of failure (PoF) and consequence of failure 
(CoF). RBI has been one of the many dedicated activities within offshore asset management 
that contribute to controlling and minimizing offshore risk (26).  
The objective of RBI is to determine what incident could occur in the event of an equipment 
failure, and how likely is that incident could happen (14). RBI analysis prioritizes risk level 
based on the probability and consequences with regards to different degradation 
mechanisms. Then the inspection plan is redesigned according to the risk levels may impact 
the asset. 
RBI analysis is a robust method that can provides a linkage between the mechanisms that 
lead to platform structural elements degradation and the inspection approaches. If the failure 
mechanisms or degradation is predictable or detectable, then RBI could provide the 
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information needed to determine where, what, how and when to inspect, to reduce the 
uncertainty in the predicted deterioration and/or as a means of identifying deterioration 
before it becomes critical (26). The non-destructive examination (NDE) techniques are 
typically used for the inspection.  
RBI Process 
To implement RBI analysis for each susceptible element, the consequences of failure (CoF) 
and probability of failure (PoF) are assessed firstly. Both then combined to obtain risk of 
failure. (25) 
Deliverables of an RBI assessment to the inspection program: 
• Prioritization of high-risk components  “WHAT to inspect?” 
• Determination of inspection intervals    “WHEN to inspect?” 
• Selection of best inspection method      “HOW to inspect?” 
 
Benefits of using RBI approach 
• RBI approach help to optimize the inspection interval, which eliminates the cost and 
hazards from other high frequent inspections.; more risks will be reduced compared 
with the typical inspection.  
• Inspection prioritized based on elements where the safety, economic or 
environmental risks are identified as being high, accordingly reducing the frequency 
to low-risk elements. 
• RBI analysis helps to determine the following:  
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o Elements of the platform that should be inspected.  
o Degradation mechanism that should be considered. 
o Intervals of inspections. 
o Methods and types of inspection that should implemented. 
• Probability of failure can be modelled by investigating the probabilities of the various 
outcomes using a fault tree approach. 
• RBI approach ensuring that the overall risk does not exceed the risk acceptance limit 
set by the certifying authorities, regulatory and/or operator. 
• Identifying the optimal inspection or monitoring methods according to the identified 
degradation mechanisms and the agreed inspection strategy. 
 
However, the optimized inspection program by RBI will not be affected. So, the RBI not 
only provides the right approach for the inspection, but also the most effectively and 
efficiently with regards to safety, cost and time. 
 
Figure 8 : Management of risk using RBI (14) 
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RBI Method implementation for offshore steel structure platform 
Risk-based inspection able to be conducted using techniques that are qualitative, 
quantitative, or semi qualitative/semi quantitative. practically, most risk-based inspection 
efforts are conducted applying a semi qualitative/semi quantitative method. 
 
Quantitative approach 
Quantitative approach can be construed as model-based approach, where suitable models are 
implemented, a numerical value is calculated. Quantitative values can be expressed and 
presented in qualitative terms make it simple by assigning bands for PoF and CoF and 
assigning risk values to risk categories (14). By this approach the results can be used to 
calculate with more accuracy, when the risk acceptance threshold will be breached. The 
method is logical, detailed, consistent and documented. (25) 
 
Qualitative approach 
Qualitative approach can be construed as expert judgement-based approach, there is no 
numerical values assigned, but instead a descriptive ranking is provided (low, medium or 
high). Qualitative ranking is generally the outcome of applying an engineering judgement-
based approach to the assessment. (25) 
The privilege of using a qualitative approach is that the assessment can be achieved promptly 
and at low initial cost, there is not much requirement for detailed information, and the results 
are simply presented and understood. But taking into consideration that the results are 
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subjective, based on the opinions, experience and judgment of the RBI team. It is not 
straightforward to obtain results other than a ranking of items in terms of risk; the estimation 
of inspection interval based on the risk acceptance limit is not possible. (25) 
 
Semi-quantitative/Semi-qualitative approach 
Approaches are semi-quantitative or semi-qualitative in the following cases: 
Parts of the RBI assessment are carried out using qualitative or quantitative methods: 
• PoF assessment is quantitative and the CoF assessment is qualitative or vice versa. 
• PoF and CoF assessments are quantitative, whereas the risk ranking and time to 
inspection assessment are qualitative (14). 
 
In this thesis work I used semi-quantitative/semi qualitative approach, using the quantitative 
probability of failure analysis method FTA, and implementing qualitative consequence of 
failure analysis based on criticality and using engineering judgment, logic assessment and 
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What to inspect “inspection plan” 
In-service inspection is primarily concerned with the detection and monitoring of 
deterioration.  In order to establish appropriate inspection plan, we should prioritize the plan 
based on the criticality of each element on the system using RBI approach, using results for 
the probabilities and consequences analysis from the previous chapters we are able to rank 
the platform elements based on the criticality using RBI matrix and make it on groups (group 
A high “red”, group B moderate “yellow “ and group C low “green”) to assign the inspection 
frequency for each group, in the following Table 15 inspection categories grouping 
 
Group A Group B Group C 
Pedestal cranes Personnel access structures Decks Primary & Secondary steel members 
Helideck structures Pipes racks and clamps Jacket legs 
Lifeboat stations Drilling Derrick structures Risers 
Living quarter structures  Anodes 
  Piles 
  Spools 
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When to inspect “inspection frequency” 
Once the risk associated with individual equipment items has been determined and the 
relative effectiveness of different inspection techniques in reducing failure probability has 
been considered, an optimum combination of inspection methods and frequencies can be 
decided. The RBI assessment will focus attention on the equipment and associated 
deterioration mechanisms representing the most risk to the facility, thereby providing a better 
linkage between the mechanisms that lead to equipment failure and the inspection 
approaches that will effectively reduce the associated risks. 
The primary product of the RBI assessment effort will be an inspection plan for each 
equipment item evaluated.  The inspection plan will detail the unmitigated risk related to the 
current operation. For risks considered unacceptable, the plan will contain the mitigation 
actions that are recommended to reduce the unmitigated risk to acceptable levels.  The level 
of unmitigated risk will be used to evaluate the urgency for performing the inspection and 
assign priorities to the various inspection/examination tasks.  For those equipment items 
where inspection is a cost-effective means of risk mitigation, the plans shall describe the 
type, scope and frequency of inspection/examination recommended and the level of 
mitigation achieved. 
Through group ranking, inspection frequency can be assigned on 6m, 12m, 24m and 36 
months basis focusing and increasing frequency on high risk elements and eliminate 
frequency accordingly on moderate and low risk elements would be sufficient from 
financially perspective, eliminating inspection and maintenance down time and optimum 
with regards to resources use, availability and as well more safely. 
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Assigning 6 and 12 monthly inspection plans for high risk elements and 2 yearly for the 
moderate elements and 3 yearly for low risk elements which have lesser failure probabilities 
and degradation mechanism. 
The initial RBIM plan could be changed during the asset lifetime based on findings and 
anomalies which mean frequencies be able to be changed and amended by the integrity team. 
 
How to inspect “inspection strategy” 
Various inspection techniques are usually available to detect any given deterioration 
mechanism, and each method will have a different cost and effectiveness.  Inspection 
methodology should be placed using popular Non-destructive tests (NDT) inspection 
techniques described in Table (16) with compliance with industry standards and codes. It 
should be aligned with certifying authorities and regulatory requirements as well. 
 
NDT inspection techniques to be used: 
To execute the regulatory inspections a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
inspection techniques will be needed. The intent is to execute GVI or CVI to support baseline 
inspections for RBI.  
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General visual inspection (GVI)  A survey of an area of interest to identify anomalies, areas of 
damage to coatings, insulation or dimensional changes and 
prioritize close visual inspections within that area of interest.  
Close visual inspection (CVI)  Visual inspection for surface defects within 1m of the selected 
area.  
Real Time Radiography (RTR)  A screening tool that uses an electronically produced image, 
rather than on film, so that very little lag time occurs between 
the item being exposed to radiation and the resulting image.  
Pulsed Eddy Current (PEC)  A screening tool that uses an electromagnetic inspection 
technology to detect flaws and corrosion in ferrous materials 
typically hidden under layers of coating, fireproofing, or 
insulation.  
Surface Inspection  Inspection method that only examines the surface of a 
material for near surface discontinuities. Surface inspection 
methods include PT, MT and ET.  
Ultrasonic (UT)  An inspection technique based on the propagation of 
ultrasonic waves in the object or material tested.  
Computerized Radiography 
(CR)  
An inspection technique based on the propagation of radiation 
in an object that uses imaging plates instead of film.  
 
Table 16: Various NDT inspection methods 
 
The following NDT techniques and recommended frequencies to be implemented for 
Jacket platform structure elements presented in Table 17 
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System Sub system 
Inspection recommended Frequency Inspection Type 
6 Month Annual 2-Yearly 3-Yearly GVI CVI NDT ROV 
Topside Cellar Deck 
 
   
   *  
Lower Deck 
 
   
   *  
Main Deck 
 
   
   *  
Upper Deck 
 
   





























  *  




















  *  





  *  
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  *  





  *  
















   
 
    
Jacket Jacket legs 
 
   
   *  
Jacket bracing 
 
   
   *  
Risers 
 
   
   *  
Risers clamps 
 
   
   *  
Anodes 
 
   
   *  
Mud mat 
 
   
   *  
Pile cluster 
 
   
   *  
Spools 
  
   
   *  
 
 Inspection Activity Required 
 No Inspection Activity Required 
* NDT work required if any anomaly needs more investigation 
 
Table 17 : Overview of inspection plan 
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Risk-Based Maintenance (RBM) 
Risk-based maintenance (RBM) methodology provides a tool for maintenance planning and 
decision making to mitigate the PoF & CoF of equipment. The objective of the RBM is to 
diminish the overall risk of facilities, by the focus on the most critical areas and to prioritize 
the factors that are critical, and then allocates the resources and scheduling maintenance 
activities in line with the priority of failure, safety and cost constrain (13). 
Development of RBM is similar to the procedure of RBI, the process of RBM is based on 
two aspects: risk assessment and maintenance planning based on results of risk assessment. 
The RBM intends to address alternative maintenance plans and solutions to manage risks on 
systems. These systems plan to highlight risks from a safety/health/environment and/or 
business perspective. In these plans, cost-effective actions for risk mitigation are 
recommended, along with the resulting level of risk mitigation (26). However, RBM 
implementation work is complicated. 
 
Requirements of the application of RBM 
The implementation of RBM requires well-developed procedures and strict standards to 
ensure the work is well conducted, and the risks are reduced to a reasonable level in cost-
effective and cost-efficient ways. The RBM is based on risk and reliability analysis.  
According to the process of RBM, the general requirements are: 
• Before the risk and reliability assessment, cost-effective and cost-efficient 
evaluations, the acceptable risk level and criteria must be clearly defined by the 
expert’s analysis and judgment  
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• The application of RBM is based on team efforts of the multi-disciplinary employee. 
The senior management should allow the team leader to select the multi-disciplinary 
employee with the required competence from the different departments. 
• Throughout the analysis, the necessary level of data and information should be 
available. The company should have a good information system and documentation 
management to guarantee the needed support and information are accessible. And 
the employee related to the assessment should cooperate with the team members 
freely. 
• The methodologies and techniques selected should be able to conduct in the 
company, and they should be able to provide results the analyst team desired. 
• For better utilization of resources, the detailed level of assessment and evaluation 
should be conducted in line with the criticality of the facility or system (26). 
 
When to do maintenance “mitigation strategy” 
Maintenance strategy  
The purpose of maintenance is to mitigate or eliminate the consequences of a failure of 
equipment. This may be by preventing the failure before it occurs, which is what Planned 
Maintenance and Risk-Based Maintenance is concerning about. It is designed to preserve 
and restore equipment reliability by replacing or repairing damaged components before they 










For the various types of systems, the RBI could be conducted firstly. It takes use of the 
detailed data and information to analyze the failure modes, causes, and effects using a 
quantitative, qualitative, or semi-quantitative/semi-qualitative approach to assign the PoF 
and CoF for corresponding failures. When the PoF and CoF have been assigned, the detailed 
risk levels of failures can be ranked using risk matrix, and relevant scenarios can be evaluated 
to reduce the potential risks. 
All the alternatives will be evaluated by RBM analysis; the high-risk area will be highly 
prioritized with the consideration of budget constrain, available techniques, and time 
limitations. The cost should be controlled without compromising the risk. 
 
By implementing of Risk-Based Maintenance concept through the risk analysis (PoF and 
CoF modeling) results and risk matrix criticality assignment, will enable us to proceed 
accordingly with developing an efficient maintenance plan to minimize the cost of 
maintenance, increase the availability of equipment, improve safety and optimize the 
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CHAPTER 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusion 
Integrity Management aims at increasing the availability, reliability, and maintainability of 
any system, taking into consideration safety, environmental issues, and the optimization of 
total life cycle costs. The risk analysis approach integrates PoF and CoF analysis. Risk-based 
integrity management strategy attempts to answer four essential questions related to the 
integrity of the system: (i)What to inspect? (ii)When to inspect? (iii) How to inspect? 
(iv)When to do maintenance? Answering these four questions guarantees that the integrity 
planning based on risk approach is expected to provide cost-effective risk-based inspection 
and maintenance. which minimizes the consequences (related to safety, environment, and 
business) of system downtime or failure. Resulting in better asset utilization and safer 
operations. Risk-based integrity management strategies are used to improve the existing 
inspection and maintenance procedures and intervals through optimal decision procedures 
in different phases of the life cycle of the asset. 
Optimal integrity management planning for offshore platforms structures is a topic of 
considerable interest in the oil and gas industry. An efficient framework for integrity 
management is risk-based decision analysis. It is possible to establish risk-based integrity 
management methodologies, that is, to say inspection and maintenance plans, which are 
based on the criticality of structural components. 
This thesis presents a detailed RBIM analysis, which may be applied to the most critical 
components of the structure. An example of the application of the procedure is given for an 
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offshore fixed steel structure platform.  This research develops an integrity management 
strategy for an above and underwater offshore platform steel structure using RBIM 
assessment. This thesis presents a new methodology for integrity management (risk-based 
integrity management). The proposed method is more comprehensive and quantitative. It 
comprises five main modules: (i) Identification of degradation mechanisms, anomalies and 
SCEs (ii) Hazard Identification module (HAZOP study), (iii) risk analysis module, (iv) Risk 
determination and risk ranking (v) RBI and RBM strategy module.  : The first module 
identifies the elements of the platform structures suitable for the RBIM and the platform 
safety-critical elements to categorize and rank priorities based on criticality to be considered 
during RBI and RBM process. The second module identifies the anomalies and the 
degradation mechanisms affecting the platform structure, through doing hazard 
identification using a qualitative risk analysis by HAZOP. In the third module that risk 
analysis is carried out using quantitative risk analysis technique (FTA) to calculate the 
probabilities then an assignment of the consequence of failure using qualitative analysis 
based on available information and resources.  The fourth module ranks the risk to prioritize 
inspection and maintenance schedules and build an integrity management strategy. The final 
module develops the RBI model to support the RBM and integrity management strategy 
implementation. 
This thesis demonstrates the applicability of the proposed methodology by applying it to an 
offshore steel structure platform. An RBIM analysis is carried out to prove that the RBI, 
RBM methods used in this work are effective in terms of time, efficiency, and cost. 
The oil producer companies own offshore steel structure platforms can use this method to 
enhance their asset integrity, reduce inspection costs and reduce the frequency inspection. 
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Also, it can be applied in different oil and gas offshore systems typically by following the 
RBIM process and steps applied in this thesis Identifying system SCE, implementing 
HAZID, risk analysis (consequences and probabilities assignment) then developing integrity 
management plan based on RBI and RBM outputs. 
 
Recommendation for future work 
A) Development of risk-based integrity management strategy for other oil and gas assets 
RBIM planning approach can be implemented for several offshore assets and systems, e.g.  
(different platforms types, subsea systems assets, offshore loading & offloading terminals 
and oil and gas process systems). Therefore the development of risk-based integrity 
management principles for every individual oil and gas offshore and the subsea asset would 
be an area for future work in order to have an integrated system able to optimize the 
availability and reliability of the asset during its lifetime as well as able to mitigate the 
hazards and guide oil producers companies operate their assets efficiently with perspective 
to safety, resources, time and cost. 
B) Applying quantitative risk assessment to identify the consequence of failures  
A methodology for risk-based integrity management planning could be enhanced by using 
QRA for PoF and CoF as well, quantitative models will provide much better analysis results, 
in this work PoF was completed using a QRA and CoF was done using qualitative risk 
assessment which means this study considered a semi qualitative/semi quantitative risk 
based approach , using QRA methods such ETA on assessing the CoF will give more detailed 
analysis which is more reliable and make the decision maker taking confident decision with 
regards to their asset integrity management planning. 
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